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Contents

2

The Bush Doctrine
Michael Proulx

> For what is liberty but the unhampered translation of will into act? *Dante Aligheri*

On June 26th, 1776 Thomas Hickey, a member of George Washington's personal guard, was convicted of treason for his role in a plot that involved forging United States currency for pro-British ambitions. He was hanged two days later as the first casualty of United States independence. Hickey, being in the armed services, was tried under the military justice system. However, civilians involved in the plot, excluded from military tribunals, exposed issues about the colonial authority to charge them as that authority rested with the Crown of Great Britain. The necessity to eliminate the ambiguous language, as it pertained to persons residing within the various United Colonies, by the Continental Congress resulted in the *Declaration of Independence* being drafted and issued within the week.

The period leading up to the revolutionary war is noteworthy for establishing the primacy of the security of the community, above all else. What it meant to be *American*, implicitly and explicitly, required a clear enunciation and, for the time at least, was tied to allegations of opposition to the cause of America. Differentiating the status of those subjects loyal to the British monarchy and citizens disloyal to the United States troubled colonial courts until the Treaty of 1783. The Declaration of 1776 defined *sovereignty* for the founders of the new republic, and in the process identified the *other,* potential domestic insurgents whose activities could then be preempted, sparing the nascent revolution damages.[1]

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[1] James H. Kettner, (Williamsburg: University of North Carolina Press, 1978) p178-9. Up to the Treaty of 1783, the capital punishment for treason resulted in 1 known execution in New England, 4 in Pennsylvania, 1 each in Maryland and Connecticut, and none in Virginia and most of the middle and southern colonies. Those numbers may be misleading; of those convicted of treason in Maryland only the leader was hanged, with at least one, possibly four, being given the option of enlisting. In Connecticut two men were hanged for deserting the navy, raising the possibility of many more perhaps meeting similar fates at the hands of military justice. Kettner, footnotes no. 22-26 on p 182-183. Jefferson, Thomas, *the Declaration of Independence,* July 4, 1776.

Anxiety about security at the birth of the nation continues to dominate national security concerns today, reasserting itself post 9/11 in the form of the 2002 National Security Strategy and the Doctrine of Preemption contained therein, to challenge accepted meanings of *sovereignty.* The first duty of the United States government is to protect the American people and American interests. Section V of the National Security Strategy supports that controversial claim; "It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats." *Obligated to anticipate threats* is the key phrase here, where the etymology of *anticipate* denotes an action based on an expectation. It is this obligation to anticipate threats upon which the Doctrine of Preemption rests. In designating *anticipation* as a strategic alternative, the Bush Administration seized authority to initiate military action to thwart any adversarial behavior before it could be realized. The role of strategic anticipation, post 9/11, reinvigorated the strength and innocence of the community after contact with an *other* by repositioning internal anxieties externally. Incorporating the 2002 Steven Spielberg sci-fi film noire *Minority Report* as an interpretive allegory, the Doctrine of Preemption is argued as a contemporary referent of American sovereignty, insofar as it domesticates the global theatre of deterrence with *preemption* articulated as a potential response.[2]

The primacy of security, however, resides within a community's political system, and if that political system is the communal norm, then it is the *political* that is the exception that establishes the norm. It is the *political* that retains primacy to other systems, according to Schmitt, though it does not annul the remaining autonomous systems; art, economic, legal, science.[3] The primacy of security then reflects the primacy of the political, owing fealty to it. This hierarchy of the political becomes entangled with an additional binary in the problematic of liberalism and democracy, which originally

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[2] Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p123. The Foucauldian reliance on a referent follows from M. Foucault's determination that projects of representation require some original source of truth.
[3] William Rasch, *Sovereignty and its Discontents* (London: Birbeck Law Press, 2004) p10

was 'what distinguishes government?' invoking the governed. The binary which now distinguishes the political is opposition. The outcome is that government currently includes and excludes the governed in the distinction that liberal-democratic institutionalization sanctions opposition within it, but not to it – as an all inclusive hegemon.[4]

Thus, current political party polemics hint at little more than organizational differentiation – that is each party survives the rotation from the role of governing to that of opposition and back, countering any concerns of domination by sanctioning opposition within the political system itself. However this dynamic threatens system stability by neutering the political. The effect of ideological disenchantment forewarns of either apathy or potential frustration within the citizenry as those constitutionally excluded, marginal communities under represented by both government and opposition, are discounted as not legitimately political and effectively neutralized through efficiency, or by a process Rasch terms invisibilization.[5]

That processes such as invisibilization construct the politically irrelevant being – those "outside the range of law and the body politic of the citizens" as Arendt names them, excluded by any other name, proceed from a liberal and democratic problematic preclude the foundational discourses on sovereign power being derived of, for and by the people.[6] It is to these foundational discourses – discourses about prior, primary, and stable identities – that sovereignty, as it pertains in the United States, must turn before a categorical evaluation of the Doctrine of Preemption can be made.[7] For the United States the Declaration of Independence is just such a foundational text. The author of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, lobbied against 'aristocrats' and 'monocrats' and increasingly envisioned his republicanism relying on a virtuous and vigilant citizenry; one capable of defending its

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[4] Rasch p9
[5] Ibid, p10
[6] Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Toronto: CSPI, 2011) p235
[7] David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) p20

liberties against both internal and external threats. This describes the 'classical' Jeffersonian republicanism, though an emphasis on the equal rights of consenting citizens would also qualify as 'liberal'.[8] A persistent concern that America would revert to a state of collective unconsciousness, forgetting that they were a people, helped craft Jefferson's self-conscious nationalism as perpetually attentive to existential threats to the new nation's integrity and security. The United States was a nation defined by its enemies, at home and abroad. But it was also the apex of his imperial ideals: a republican people, fully conscious of itself, enlightened enough to sustain consensual union and strong enough to resist coercion by any enemy. Union was predicated on shared commitment to 'federal and republican principles' that in turn depended on reciprocal recognition and identification among citizens in an inclusive national community.[9] Jefferson further believed that the existence and future prosperity of the new federal republic – a regime of consent, not coercion – lay in the character of the people, the source of all legitimate authority. In effect, the nation was conjured into existence in order to secure and sustain a new and improved republican empire.[10] Jefferson's republican ideals were not a spontaneous epiphany. They were instead influenced, and even parodied similar foundational texts in England, namely *Magna Carta* and Sir Edward Coke's *Institutes.*

In April 1628 Sir Edward Coke, a notable councilor in the English Parliament, drafted a petition to the King of Britain which confirmed the rights and liberties of British subjects as expressed in Magna Carta. This long list of grievances was the model upon which Jefferson penned his Declaration of Independence – a list of grievances taken by the citizenry against the abuses perpetrated against the subjects of the land. When the English upper house, The Lords, determined to reserve the power of the sovereign in the personage of the Crown, Coke responded, "…but 'sovereign power' is no

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[8] Peter S. Onuf, *Jefferson's Empire* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000) p7
[9] Ibid, p13
[10] Ibid, p16

Parliamentary word…it weakens *Magna Carta* and all the statutes; for they are absolute, without any saving of 'Sovereign Power'…Magna Carta is such a fellow that he will have no 'Sovereign'."[11] This *Petition of Right* garnered little attention until confirmation by the Long Parliament of 1641 when it was entrenched as one of three overriding documents of English liberty.[12] Coke's *Reports* and his famous four volume *Institutes* travelled to North America aboard *The Mayflower,* where they informed the legal professions and Presidents alike well into the nineteenth century. Samuel E. Thorpe, Professor of Legal History at Harvard University maintained that certain of Coke's doctrines and ideas took firmer root in the colonies than at home and that much of American law need be traced back no further than to his books.[13] Even Hobbes complained that Coke endeavoured throughout the *Institutes* to diminish the Crown's authority.[14] Coke's legacy of jurisprudence significantly instructs U.S. Constitutional Law, and most profoundly in M*arbury v Madison* which cemented judicial independence and the predominance for judicial interpretation of the constitution.[15]

The concept of sovereignty, an ambiguous term without a unitary definition, is much contested in the modern interconnected world that the term borders on irrelevant – assuming a sovereignty applied to existing entitical characterizations.[16] For the purposes of discussion "the supreme authority within a territory" will suffice as definition. Contained within the definition are recognition of concerns about legitimacy, supremacy and territoriality, and the specific limits of each.[17] Indeed, pinning the concept down is itself a politically contestable choice – suggesting some beginning point, or gestation period, perhaps that is how it may be best approached – as a thing in and of itself which immolates

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[11] John Hostetler, *Sir Edward Coke* (Chichester, England: Barry Rose Law Publishers, 1997) p135
[12] Ibid, p139
[13] Ibid, p150 footnote 3. Selden Society Lecture on Coke in the Hall of Lincoln's Inn on March 17, 1952.
[14] Ibid, p152
[15] Allen D. Boyer, *Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) p84
[16] Hent Kalmo, Quentin Skinner, *Sovereignty in Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p1
[17] Daniel Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority, and International Society", *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, Robert Jackson ed. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) p148

something priceless of one's own by denying the use of it to others in a corporeal proprioceptive sense, excluding inclusions and including exclusions on contemporaneous and potentially ad hoc bases.[18] Indeed, Cynthia Weber suggests an ethereal entity as the sovereign – the very shadows of a corporeal existence, yet theoretically unsubstantiated in a continual process of creative destruction, redefinition and application to all potentialities of conscious organization. The origin and effect of sovereignty become synonymous.[19] This *cogito ergo sum* moment in sovereign ascension derives from the recognition that it is at one and the same time communities of sovereign states and communities as the foundation for sovereign states that produce, by intervention practices the effect, and guarantee, by agreement of an uncontested definition assumed through observation of a particular community, the origin of a sense of sovereignty.[20]

The Doctrine of Preemption is here argued as a sovereign sensing itself in time and space, proprioception, but also a declaration of global hegemony in that the community of judgment would be 'like minded' nation-states, self referencing each other in a large simulation of international democracy, or it may also be the 'unitary' approach which refers only to the judgment of its own community – in this case the US citizenry. The desire for peace argues against a solitary political hegemony however, in that it constrains the opportunity to exit the polity, or that checks on power would be difficult to establish and impose. Instead global trade suggests a peaceful alternative as the costs associated with war increase as trade does. Facultative beings can be expected to respond to increased costs associated with war with a subsequent reduction in conflict, providing a more reliable method to reducing conflict than adopting postures of threat. However, as long as conflict potentiality exists defense measures remain appropriate and Foreign Policy assumes a performative aspect in

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[18] Kalmo et al., p1-2
[19] Weber, p6
[20] Ibid, p4-6, 123

establishing the binary of domestic/foreign. The necessity of the state to theorize and then realize through legislation contingencies mitigating 'danger' as an example of the 'external' world, drives to the root of adopting meanings of sovereign.[21]

That only what is clearly defined can be accurately valued or meaningfully exchanged challenges Schmitt's State of Exception in that the correct recognition of the facts and subsequent elucidation is established through the process of argumentation by responsible parties to the debate.[22] Schmitt's hypothesis is challenged when considering *martyrdom*, a rival integrity when a citizen is forced to *choose* to be a martyr, a certain state of exception to be sure, as the only option of opposition in a global hegemon. Coke, and later Jefferson, in their works focused on decision *making,* the process of arriving at a determination, not the particular determination itself; never reaching the temporal horizon, or as Coke and Jefferson may have indicated, it's the journey not the destination that is exceptional. Coke once counseled, "Law and discretion should be concomitant, and that one to be an accident inseparable to the other, so as neither law without discretion, lest it should incline to rigor, nor discretion without law, lest confusion should follow, should be put in use."[23] He concludes that legal precedent traces similarity of fact rather than illustrates common principles by perpetually challenging current structures in practice and theory, a key methodology in his 'artificial reason' logic.[24]

The methodology of artificial reason is a central theme in *Minority Report.* The movie challenges preemption temporally through dialogue; "the fact that you prevented it from happening doesn't change the fact that it was going to happen," or "it's not the future if you stop it." The opening sequence shows an imminent murder being averted by a PreCrime unit's timely intervention. The

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[21] Campbell, p15-20
[22] Boyer, p98
[23] Ibid, p99
[24] Ibid, p100 footnote 51

perpetrator is *Mirandized* for a murder he had not committed, 'haloed' (a physical incapacitating headband) and sent to the Hall of Containment to serve out his sentence. The next sequence follows PreCrime's John Anderton (Tom Cruise) on a late night run through a dystopian 2054 Washington, D.C. cityscape where video advertisements promote PreCrime for an upcoming national referendum. One ad flashes "Life", "Liberty" and "Pursuit of Happiness" while a voice over proclaims, "That which keeps us safe, will also keep us free," establishing the narrative framework for what unfolds.

The plot involves Anderton being pursued for a murder he is thought to commit in 36 hours. While this pursuit of one of its own takes place, a representative of the Justice Department, Detective Witwer (Colin Farell) is on hand to investigate the potential for human error within the system before the national roll-out. In the end Anderton chooses not to commit the crime he is being hunted down for. Instead, Burgess (Max Von Sydow), the Head of PreCrime, is the guilty party that has set Anderton up by manipulating the process. The climax occurs on a hotel patio reception for PreCrime's approval to go national, when the antagonists face each other. The 'precogs', the triumvirate of deified visionaries around whom the system is based foresee the murder of Anderton by Burgess. When confronted with the facts and the knowledge that the 'precogs' will have already seen him commit the murder Anderton asks him, "What is it worth, just one more murder?" before the impassioned appeal, "You can still choose." The end comes with Burgess electing to take his own life, disproving PreCrime, versus proving PreCrime's infallibility by committing the crime envisioned, and suffering the consequences.

The similarities to the Bush Doctrine of Preemption are disturbing, for example the Supreme Court case *Rumsfeld v Padilla (2004)*. Padilla was alleged to have been involved in a plot to detonate a dirty bomb within the contiguous US. His constitutional right of *habeas corpus* was indefinitely suspended and he was incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The majority decision of the Court

went, "[what is] at stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society…For if this nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyranny even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny." [25] When the Bush Administration was asked for comment, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz replied, "There was no plan. We stopped this man in the initial planning stages."[26] As in the movie, errors of judgment may occur. Imminent is a fixed term – it has little to no temporal elasticity. Something will always *be* imminent until it is not. Burgess' suicide illustrates that choice potentiality exists right up until action occurs. The 'death' of Burgess answers the question of martyrdom mentioned above; that which does not represent an ending, but rather a continuing tangent to the whole which, through reflection, obtains an uncontested sovereignty unto itself by being an indisputable act of opposition of some form.

The events of 9.11.2001 confounded the US, and in a 'fit of uncharacteristic honesty' resulted in the tearing off the veil of legality the UN provides.[27] Preemption then targets/positions the current world order to either; agree to emulate a US structure globally, or 'creates a monster' that resides 'outside' all but its own methodology, i.e. that dismisses any definition of itself generated by the 'other' – a regressive self-reference. The threat of sanctioned state violence, as a performative to inclusion, backed by a rationalized legitimacy – ergo *just,* transfers focus to the mode of justification. Yet the set of universally accepted moral and legal codes are more an abstract temporal horizon than realizable concretes. Global issues along this receding horizon against which all are judged then requires evaluation of 'push' and 'pull' factors for local compliance. A jurisdiction undefined within the apparatus, opposing its own inclusion threatens the rationale behind Coke's 'artificial reasoning' and forces the jurisdiction to *choose* martyrdom, the compelled comprehension that its existential

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[25] Matthew S. Weinert, *Democratic Sovereignty* (London: University College Press, 2007) p2
[26] Weber, "Securitizing the Unconscious: The Bush Doctrine of Preemption and *Minority Report", Geopolitics Vol. 10, no. 3* (Oct. 2005) p115
[27] Rasch, p58

anxieties will be realized. This potential raises concerns of hypocrisy, that instance when the liberalist trajectory towards global acceptance becomes *il*liberal by coercing the actualization of its liberal agenda – from the larger structure compelling compliance with its idealized pluralism or annihilation in opposition to coercion.

Minority Report acts as a contemporary interpretive guide by posing an alternative future to anticipatory preemption/prevention where the institutional punishment for one fatal crime becomes another, thus confusing sovereign right with the *un*just enemy.[28] The alternative suggested in *Minority Report* further contests Brenkman's assertion of *power-beyond-responsibility* contained within the person of the President of the US, not that it is, but that it never was.[29] The insistence that errors and deceptions did not ultimately matter, since the result was good, further undermines the very principle of accountability, with whispers of Weber's sovereign/intervention binary collapsing into one spacio-temporal coordinate - the domestic.[30] Aligning the failure of international systems of organization to protect US citizens, at home and abroad allowed the Bush administration to seize that moment to re-install a 'state of exception' to relieve its Benjaminian sense of guilt.

Sovereignty, Weinert suggests, is but a re-interpretation of private property, re-formatted from the 'final and absolute <u>in</u> political community' to the' final and absolute <u>of</u> political community', removing individual rights and liberties from the yoke of majority rule. As such he opposes Weber, who equates sovereignty with an ontological status – a state of *being*- though being and doing is the end ontology which sees sovereignty as an ongoing process of regulation and the expansion and contraction of scope of functional responsibility."[31] Non-sovereign entities such as disease, climate

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[28] Michael Doyle, Preface and International Law and Current Standards, e-text, p25, Russ Castronovo and Susan Gillman, "The Study of the American Problems" (Toronto: CSPI, 2011) p22

[29] John Brenkman, "Introduction" and "The Imagination of Power", p3. Also p5, in text quote by Kagan.

[30] Ibid, p11

[31] Weinert, p112

change and terrorism erode the insulation of the internal supremacy on constitutional structures with external responses.[32] The Warsaw Declaration of 2000 included a series of core democratic principles and practices as one would envision Habermas' Cosmopolitan Law – authorized and legitimized by a 'Community of Democracies', yet this continues to invisibilize internal opposition through the simulation of democratic international sovereignty. Here Schmitt advances to the fore if transgression occurs; what processes would be invoked to compel, or result, in a reversion to the norm?[33]

The absolute fealty to the law that Coke inspired in Jefferson posed problems for the traditional spatial practices of power, namely states, alliances and/or political parties, the very entitical practices oriented to the space of power. A potential for duplicity is then perceived when foundational texts work to constitute the identities in whose name they operate. Put simply, while they retain some power, foundational categories of ordering are exhausted. They maintain an existence and identity by specifying exceptions and exclusions, but no longer are they able to mobilize support in terms of a prior and positive ideal. More importantly, the desire to legal order has itself become a source of danger in our time. Political discourses which speak only of the interest and institutional bases for action; or the need for standardization, normalization, or mastery as the technologies of order; or power as an object or ethics as a command; or of sovereignty and territoriality as the container of politics; has lost all ability – if it ever had it – to provide security.[34]

Minority Report best interprets the potentiality of a Doctrine of Preemption, arguing against the institutional punishment for one fatal crime becoming another, when Burgess warns Anderton the Attorney General's Representative, Detective Witwer, was there to evaluate the PreCrime Department,

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[32] Weinert, p136
[33] Ibid, p137
[34] Campbell, p20

"The gentlemen at *Justice* (my italics) want to take this away from us…deciding if what we are doing is some noble enterprise or the chance to change the way this country fights crime."

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
Ethnic Integration in Europe: The Effects of EU Soft-Power, Transitional Justice, and Power-Sharing Governance

Nyiri DuCharme

The fall of the Soviet Union, and communism in general, marked a transition point into a new phase of world order. In Central and Eastern Europe in particular, there is a fascinating amount of effort undertaken by the international community to further ethnic integration. The European Union (EU) is a supranational organization whose mandate has increasingly focused on sub-regional and continental integration, requiring the reconciliation and resolution of prior tensions and conflicts in order to gain (coveted) membership[35]. Many former Soviet or Yugoslav states currently experience economic hardship and political insecurity, and EU membership would offer a means to eradicate these endemic societal dilemmas[36].

This paper aims to analyze the post-conflict experience of Europe after 1989, specifically whether the European Union provides the essential apparatus, as a result of its soft power and value dynamics, to facilitate integration of minorities into the social, political, and economic shared space of the state. Some attention will also be given to whether transitional justice or power-sharing initiatives are major factors in the endeavour to integrate.

The paper will first illustrate the increasing political and ethnic integration in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, as well as the EU's soft power capabilities, Strabac et al.'s modernization theory, and Tepfenhart's four major causes of ethnic conflict. Next, an analysis of transitional justice mechanisms, power-sharing, and concepts of responsibility (individual, state,

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[35] European Council in Copenhagen 1993

[36] Katchanovski 2011

societal) in post-conflict regions[37] will be illustrated, as well as Horowitz's ideas on constitution building. Thirdly, attention will be given to EU member states who seem to be shifting back towards xenophobic policies, particularly Hungary and Greece – and what this means for the sustainability of EU soft power as an incentive tool for political, social, and economic integration.

The European climate after the collapse of communism in 1989 was one of massive change in a number of aspects, but particularly in terms of population integration and heterogeneous societies. As the EU expanded in the 1990s to include a now-unified Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal, the continent became increasingly integrated politically, and the eastern states looked to the expanding EU as a beacon[38]. The EU also integrated economically through the adoption of a common currency and the creation of the "Eurozone" – resulting in another sphere where the EU represented influence, economic power. Even more so today, after the 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania), and 2013 (Croatia) enlargements, less-developed former Soviet and former Yugoslav states are seeing that it may be within reach to have successful partnerships or even full accession to the EU. The southeastern European region can be described using regional security complex theory[39]; there is significant system-level interplay of global institutions and leading powers around the southeastern European situation, but there also exists a subsystem interplay of the states within the region themselves, and their immediate security concerns driven by ethnic tensions.

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[37] Subotic 2011

[38] Strabac et al. 2012

[39] Buzan and Waever 2003

Given the EU's vocal and active support for human rights[40], and the requirements for accession[41], it seems that a self-perpetuating cycle could unfold, consisting of (1) promoting human – including ethnic – rights, leading to (2) decreasing ethnic tension, leading to (3) further entrenchment of human rights and so forth, as these post-conflict states aim to integrate with the EU in some form. These states aim to integrate with the EU due to its economic incentives of being the largest trading bloc and providing free movement of labour, but also due to its political and social incentives of stability, promotion of human rights, and uniformity in laws in all member states. Post-conflict arrangements are often mediated by external organizations, for example the United Nations with regards to Kosovo, and the European Union with regards to Macedonia[42].

The EU has always experienced forms of ethnic migration, but in the post-1989 context, many of these population movements have been labour-motivated[43]. Following a Keynesian economic approach, "both welfare differences between a potential receiving and a potential sending country and the situation in the labour market in receiving countries may influence migration flows"[44]. Particularly in the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav states, Tepfenhart notes that "economic issues have the potential to increase tension between groups… the transition from a central planned economy to a market economy was very traumatic for the people"[45]. The clientalist, trust-based economies of the former Soviet and former Yugoslav states had difficult transitions to capitalist economies where business

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[40] Charter Of Fundamental Rights Of The European Union 2000

[41] European Council in Copenhagen 1993

[42] Bieber 2004

[43] Jennissen 2011

[44] Ibid. p.262

[45] Tepfenhart 2013, p.91

arrangements were based on contract rather than familiarity with individuals[46]. Jennissen notes that during labour shortages, receiving countries lower their entry criteria, leading to influxes of migrants, particularly from states bordering the EU to the south and east; however, during phases of high unemployment, entry criteria may become more difficult, and tensions between domestic and migrant populations may rise due to competition for jobs[47].

Although there are political factors for heightening ethnic tensions, social factors have been presented that in theory would help reduce ethnic tensions and promote integration. A significant school of thought is the modernization theory illustrated by Strabac et al., whereby "with the increasing modernization of societies, ethnic identities and ethnic antipathies will decline…members of the modern strata of the population will be less likely to express ethnic intolerance than those in traditional groups"[48]. Following common logic on urban demographics, this conclusion seems reasonable – the multiculturalism prevalent in major cities such as London, Paris, and Berlin seem to be proponents to this fact. Modernization, including aspects of urbanization, promotes education and socializes tolerance[49]; they find that "empirical research on ethnic intolerance and prejudice is regularly producing results that are consistent with the modernization approach"[50]. However, Budapest, Athens, and Warsaw are not global capitals exhibiting as widespread multicultural populations. The distribution of intolerance across Europe leans heavier in the east- and southeastern European states more then in the West.

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[46] Tepfenhart 2013

[47] Jennissen 2011

[48] Strabac et al. 2012 p.461

[49] Strabac et al. 2012

[50] Ibid, p.461

Tepfenhart suggests that there are four major sources of ethnic conflict: weak states, political issues, economic issues, and cultural issues[51]. The primary example she uses is the former Yugoslavia, where the weak state environment allowed ethnic conflict to emerge. As the Soviet Union collapsed and a number of referenda took place in Yugoslavia to determine its future, "individual groups suddenly had a security dilemma regarding their life in the future"[52]. Again, this highlights the subsystem interplay within the region and their immediate security concerns, as illustrated in regional security complex theory[53]. James Fearon argues that the main causes of ethnic conflict arise from commitments – tensions escalate when political communities are experience rising tensions and have no mediating third party to guarantee agreements[54].

It is important to look at transitional justice and power-sharing frameworks in assessing initiatives to reduce ethnic tensions. Subotic's "triple accountability" concept[55], involving individual, state, *and* societal responsibilities in order to provide a sustainable reconciliation process and effective justice framework. This will be illustrated, followed by Bieber's analysis of "functionality and dysfunctionality"[56] of power-sharing institutions and finally, Horowitz's emphasis on constitution-building processes will be outlined.

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[51] Tepfenhart 2013

[52] Ibid. p.88

[53] Buzan and Waever 2003

[54] Fearon 1994

[55] Subotic 2011, p.157

[56] Bieber 2004, p.85

A transitional justice effort is essential in furthering goals of sustainable long-term peace in a post-conflict state[57]. Although the primary role in this regard was once held by states themselves, intergovernmental and supranational institutions such as the United Nations and European Union are becoming more involved as mediators and actors in transitional justice frameworks. In fact, the EU "develops and promotes transitional justice policies as part of its enlargement strategy as well as its broader foreign and security policies"[58]. It is worth to point out the emphasis on regionalism and the impact of justice on security concerns, once again demonstrated by the regional security complex theory[59]. To a certain extent, lustration must be experienced by the population to entrench the truth and ease the reconciliation and integration processes. The EU holds an incredible amount of soft power; that is to say, its ideological and value-based diplomacy is a powerful force in facilitating these transitional justice initiatives[60].

Existing apparatuses aside, some additional qualifications have contributed to research around transitional justice and power-sharing initiatives.

Subotic proposes a triple-tiered approach to criminal regulation and justice frameworks: hold individual perpetrators, state policy advisors and implementers, and the supportive or approving society accountable[61]. This relies on the assumption that statements of truth around criminal acts undertaken, identification of individual perpetrators, and appropriate punishment are necessary to reinforce

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[57] Crossley-Frolick 2011

[58] Ibid. p.33

[59] Buzan and Waever 2003

[60] Subotic 2011

[61] Ibid.

reconciliation initiatives, particularly by ending impunity[62]. In referring to state policy advisors and implementers, that is to hold accountable those in the conflict-affected regime rather than those in the government at the time of transitional justice and post-conflict integration measures. The individual responsibility proposed falls along what currently exists in the global justice framework – exemplified by the International Criminal Court and its emphasis on individual accountability for actions undertaken.

However, the striking feature of this proposed understanding of responsibility is the societal tier, whereby citizens may be "held responsible for agreeing to and materially supporting – for example, through taxation – state policies that produced mass atrocity"[63]; she argues that as the atrocities progressed in Bosnia specifically, society became receptive to the military successes and normalized and legitimized the criminal proceedings. Subotic's analysis is powerful, and constructs a revised way of looking at ethnic conflicts, particularly in light of the International Criminal Tribunals that also focus on the individual perpetrators. Given the EU's commitment to promoting and sustaining human rights, equality, and the rule of law, it would be worthwhile to consider the implications of Subotic's findings on EU accession requirements in the future.

Bieber's analysis of power-sharing separates institutions into three parts: the legislative, governmental, and veto-wielding sharing of power, all of which must exhibit a shared decision-making process at each stage, rather than each group dividing up its own responsibilities[64]. Power sharing must be exhibited at the parliamentary level since in a democracy, these are the institutions where laws are

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[62] Mendeloff 2004

[63] Subotic 2011, p.160

[64] Bieber 2004

proposed and passed, and where the people of the state are represented. Power sharing should be

exercised at the governmental level through a legal framework requiring cooperation between groups –

although this reduces minority inclusion to simply a fulfillment of a legal requirement, it assists in the

political process of coalition building in the executive branch[65]. Finally, veto rights are a significant

factor in power-sharing agreements, but their high stakes mean that they can have very negative

consequences on the functioning of the arrangement, particularly when an issue being discussed is of

"vital interest" to one or more of the groups[66]. The symbolism of power-sharing should not be

understated, since a maintained power-sharing arrangement begins to define a state as multiethnic, and

its citizens become normalized to the "other" group having proportional representation in political

decision-making[67].

In the states with recent memory of conflict, some process of transitional justice would be

fruitful in tandem with, and subsumed within, EU measures to develop a post-conflict rhetoric and

quell rivalries and tensions with "other" groups. Power-sharing measures, as well as Horowitz's

argument for constitution building, may also be effective in states where there are large and permanent

minority populations, requiring them to be formally integrated into the political apparatus of the state.

He argues that conciliatory institutions should be created that mitigate conflict, and new constitutions

should be developed that account for minority and ethnic rights outright[68]. This can be combined with

Bieber's power-sharing concept, whereby the extent to which each group shares power and exercises

parliamentary, governmental, and veto-sharing rights be embedded in the state's constitution. However,

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[65] Bieber 2004

[66] Ibid. p.98

[67] Ibid.

[68] Horowitz 2008

issues may remain on the social front around integration of minority and "other" groups into the welfare system, education system, and labour market in particular.

Labour interests are one of the main motivations for the bipolarization of political parties in Europe. In recent years, observers have noted a "repetition on the right of a development that first occurred on the left – a development destined to shape not just political fortunes in Europe but also its party systems"[69]; "far-right political parties campaigning on ethnic issues"[70] became more outspoken as they gained support.

There are many benefits to the EU on paper, particularly as a state pursues accession and adopts the Copenhagen Criteria, but once they have joined, the EU has far less power in conducting the internal sovereign affairs of its member states. The policy of free movement within the Schengen Area facilitates the efforts of individuals who wanted to leave their country for a more prosperous EU country, a phenomenon which when it occurred en masse, has resulted in increased opportunity for ethnically motivated frustrations and scapegoat tactics to take place[71]. The common reference to a "Polish plumber" alludes to this idea – particularly in the United Kingdom and Ireland, migrants from Eastern Europe take the roles of manual labour workers as they move within the Schengen Area[72], an observation that is used in two ways: to chastise migrant populations for occupying the lower tiers of society, and in somewhat of a contradiction, for 'stealing' the jobs of domestic workers who work in the trades. These sentiments have also been raised in Greece, and are a primary factor in light of the economic crisis in the country; a further analysis of Greece (as well as Hungary) will follow.

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[69] Bale 2003, p.68

[70] Strabac et al. 2012, p.460

[71] Ibid. p.461

[72] Grossman and Woll 2011

The far right gains a disproportionate amount of support from working-class men living in urban areas who have low educational qualifications or job security – individuals who experience substantially the cons of globalization, particularly the 'threat' posed by migrant and foreign competition to their jobs, their welfare system, and their culture[73]. Bipolarization takes place as the traditionally-strong left in European states see an increase in right-leaning parties, signifying that the "right has got its act together to ensure that votes and seats that were previously wasted on pariahs are no longer wasted because they are no longer pariahs"[74]. The centre is being drowned out by the polarization of the centre-right towards the far-right, requiring the centre-left to follow similar suit and associate with the far-left presence in many states. But which states exactly are witnessing this change in their political landscape?

The EU, as an institution that promotes equality, human rights, and the rule of law, is experiencing internal turmoil from some of its member states, not just those on the outside looking in. EU members (Hungary and Greece in particular) have exhibited behaviour not traditionally seen in the EU sphere. This shows that the EU, with all its resources and soft power, may not actually be able to constrain xenophobic or intolerant behaviours of its member states once they have completed accession.

"Fears of the effects of globalization and social tensions evoked by the awareness of Europe as a continent of migration have paved the way for a new wave of identity politics and scapegoat ideologies"[75]. It is becoming evident that far-right parties are gaining support and are becoming more

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[73] Bale 2003

[74] Ibid. p.71

[75] Halasz 2009, p.490

mainstream – as the EU promotes equality and human rights in its peripheral partnership countries, it is experiencing a bubbling of tensions within its borders.

In Hungary, nationalist rhetoric targeting the immigrant and Roma populations increased due to the rise of popularity of the Movement for a Better Hungary party (referred to henceforth as Jobbik). According to Jordan, right-wing extremism in Hungary has "doubled… since 2003. Hungary, once dubbed the "happiest barrack in the Soviet camp", is arguably the unhappiest of the 10 ex-communist members who have since joined the European Union"[76]. The Jobbik party appeals to the educated youth by using scapegoats, and highlighting the failures of Hungarian development in comparison with its neighbours Austria and Slovakia. Their coat of arms resembles the symbol of the Arrow Cross party, the Hungarian version of Gestapo. Jobbik also maintains a militant branch, which march through minority-populated neighbourhoods in an all-black uniform and the Jobbik insignia[77]. As Jordan articulates, "the roots of democracy have grown, but they haven't burrowed so deep that they cannot be shaken"[78]; Jobbik gained 16.7% of the vote in the most recent national election.

In Greece, the Golden Dawn party was registered in 1993, but held its first congress three years earlier in 1990; years later it became known that the congress hall was adorned with Swastika flags, and members of the party had participated in the Republics Srpska army in the Bosnian War, and were present at the Srebrenica massacre[79]. Golden Dawn members were accused of committing "hate crimes against political opponents and ethnic minorities"[80], and having open clashes with anarchists and leftist

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[76] Jordan 2010, p.99

[77] Jordan 2010

[78] Ibid. p.100

[79] Bistis 2013

[80] Ibid. p.44

extremists. In 2009, Golden Dawn received less than half of 1% of the national vote[81]. As the vastness

of the global financial crisis began to be understood, Golden Dawn capitalized on the anger among the

population. They blamed Greece's problems on illegal immigrants and the country's creditors

(International Monetary Fund, EU, European Central Bank); the leader of the party proposed to remove

all illegal immigrants and the creditors from Greece, and place landmines around the border to prevent

additional migrants from entering[82]. Their proclamations were reminiscent to those of the junta that

ruled Greece from 1967-1974. Golden Dawn's popularity rose as they adopted programs that benefitted

Greek nationals only – they presented themselves as a "heroic outlaw robbing from the rich and giving

to the poor"[83], although the poor had to be Greek and speak Greek to benefit.

　　In its 2013 World Report, Human Rights Watch states that in Greece, "xenophobic violence

reached alarming proportions with regular attacks on immigrants and asylum seekers, and growing

evidence of Golden Dawn members' involvement"[84]; given that Golden Dawn was by this point the

third-largest party, this is a massive example of the EU's inability to harness its soft power and take

action in Greece: the EU was seen as one of the sources of the problem.

　　Immigration is essential in Western countries with traditionally low birth rates, in order to keep

the demographics balanced. However, states such as Germany and France are adopting short-term

approaches to immigration; individuals arrive in Europe and work on short-term contracts without the

possibility of family reunification claims, and once they contribute to the economy (and pay their

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[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid. p.49

[84] Ibid. p.52

taxes), they leave before becoming a burden to the state[85]. Increasingly, "direct and indirect forms of discrimination are… tolerated and even mandated in many areas of life"[86]. The effect of the increasing popularity of the radical right is that xenophobic, intolerant, and racist crimes or behaviours become justifiable under their ideologies and policies. The cases of Hungary and Greece have been highlighted, but this phenomenon has been observed as well in Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Romania, and the United Kingdom[87] – members states of the EU, and some of which are traditionally thought of as ideal host countries.

Finally, some weight should also be given to ideas of nationalism: both ethnic identity, as well as state or civic identity. Tepfenhart argues that the predominant identity is constructed based on how a state is created; state nationalism is encouraged by an existing state that created itself by assimilating other groups, and ethnic nationalism is encouraged by communities which want to be recognized as nations but do not have a state[88]. This seems to suggest that states with a significant minority or multiethnic population are predestined to experience difficulties with the groups within their borders. Fox and Vermeersch go on to claim that the EU's expansions eastward in 2004 "did not sound the death knoll of nationalism in the region; rather, it signaled its reinvention and, in some respects, reinvigoration"[89]. Particularly in Hungary and Poland, nationalism has been redefined, inter-party

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[85] Halasz 2009

[86] Ibid. p.491

[87] Ibid.

[88] Tepfenhart 2013

[89] Fox and Vermeersch p.325

competition has revolved around each party's interpretation of the 'nation', and radical nationalist organizations are defining themselves in opposition to the EU[90].

    This paper has aimed to analyze the various factors of ethnic conflicts, and whether post-conflict integration efforts in the EU have been fruitful in creating a sustainable peace. Significant attention has been given to Hungary since it seems to be a fulcrum for various rising issues around ethnic tensions, xenophobia, the empowerment of the radical right, and in anti-EU sentiments. However, Poland, Greece, and to a lesser extent France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are also experiencing an increase in intolerance for minority groups. Whether this is a reflection of the post-financial crisis recovery period, or a sign of times to come, remains to be seen. In the states with recent memory of conflict, some process of transitional justice would be fruitful, in tandem with EU measures, to develop a post-conflict rhetoric and quell rivalries and tensions with "other" groups. Power-sharing measures, as well as Horowitz's argument for constitution building, may also be effective in states where there are large and permanent minority populations. As argued in this paper, for the EU to curb these behaviours by its member states that contradict its own mission outlined in its Charter, it must exercise its soft power and take decisive action in the mechanisms within its member states, rather than exclusively focusing on states still in the accession process.

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[90] Fox and Vermeersch 2010

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The Decline of Devotion: From Catholicism to Laïcité in Québec
Aaron Pinto

You know, way back, everybody here was Catholic, just as in Spain or Ireland. And then, at a very specific moment – it was during the year 1966 – in only a few months, the churches suddenly emptied out. A very strange phenomenon, one that nobody has ever been able to explain.

– Father Raymond Leclerc (Gilles Pelletier) in *Les invasions barbares*
(directed by Denys Arcand; Cinémaginaire, 2003).[91]

In the space of little more than fifty years, between the end of the Second World War and the close of the twentieth century, the Canadian province of Québec puzzlingly went from being one of the most socially traditional, politically conservative, and religiously devout regions of the developed world to one of the very least; becoming a so-called *province laïque*, or secular province. As a result, for Catholics in Québec today, let alone adherents of other faiths, religion has come to occupy a different place in their personal consciousness than what it once did; religion has become a freely chosen personal journey rather a celebration of a total vision incarnate in society.

Existing explanations for the sweeping changes in Québec, for both their breadth and their abruptness, are many and varied. They indict a panoply of variables, some marked with the impersonality of large-scale social differentiation and others with the intimacy of individuals' crises of commitment. In the past, many sociologists used Québec as a case in point to exemplify the theory of secularization, arguing the spread of modernity would inevitably lead to the waning of religion. Austrian-American sociologist Peter Berger argued at length that the rational and scientific discourse dominant in modern society produced an approach to the world that left no room for divine

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[91] In the original French, the character of the priest says: "Vous savez, ici, autrefois, tout le monde était catholique, comme en Espagne ou en Irlande. Et à un moment très précis, en fait pendant l'année 1966, les églises se sont brusquement vidées, en quelques mois. Un phénomène très étrange, que personne n'a jamais pu expliquer." Denys Arcand, *Les invasions barbares : Scénario* (Montréal : Les Éditions du Boréal, 2003). p. 154.

transcendence. Here, Berger congruently echoes the conclusion of Max Weber that the instrumental rationality dominant in modern society inevitably has led to the disenchantment of the world and thus the waning of religion. Qu*é*bec, for many, is a testament to the philosophies of Berger and Weber.

This essay, on the contrary, will suggest otherwise. It will demonstrate, in fact, that Qu*é*bec's experience cannot be cited as a confirmation of the theory of secularization. Instead, this essay will contribute to the argument of two prominent thinkers. The first being sociologist Charles Taylor who has contended that secularism is not simply the absence of religion but rather an intellectual and political category that itself needs to be understood as an historical construction. The second is humanities professor Mark Lilla who has poignantly suggested there has been more of an integration of Church and State that has come through with wriggled attempts of placing political life under God's authority. Both thinkers are convincing and offer a foundation of knowledge as it concerns the case of Qu*é*bec. In line with the philosophies of Taylor and Lilla, this essay will show that the nation of Qu*é*bec has gone through certain historical struggles that have allowed the Church to recognize its waning authority, ultimately bringing to fruition a situation where the "omnipotent God was able to be displaced by the omnipotent law-giver." Although a God has been displaced, however, a clear hallowed residue remains, which has still helped to mold Qu*ébé*cois thought, albeit more silently and subtly.

The Roman Catholic Church of Qu*é*bec transformed tremendously from the start of the seventeenth century to the end of the twentieth and continues to do so. Many times, we tend to forget that, in earlier centuries, the Church led the creation of missions and scholarship which helped to spread ideas of Catholicism 'from sea to sea'. The sacred institution was also vital to the development of cities like Montr*é*al and Qu*é*bec City. Most importantly, however, the Church was the bearer of education and healthcare for the people of Qu*é*bec. It was through these various and central means whereby the Catholic faith became firmly embedded in Qu*ébé*cois culture; shaping the society and its

institutions to this today as social and political fragments linger from Quebec's profoundly religious past.

To understand the province's queasiness about organized religion, it is necessary to appreciate just how strong the Church used to be – and how decisively it was displaced. In an effort to avoid emphasis on presentism, this essay will traverse back in history to examine the structural and sociological precursors of the Roman Catholic Church's diminished salience among francophone Qu*é*becers. It will start by highlighting the overarching power of the Church prior to the 1960s, and then ease into a period of Qu*é*bec's history when Church attendance plummeted; education was not a privilege granted by the clergy, but a right protected by the state; marriage was something one might or might not do; and the slogan *Maîtres chez nous* had become a rallying cry for everything from anti-clericalism to the nascent sovereignty movement. The essay will also take time to focus on the 'quiet' tumult of the *Révolution tranquille* and the eager reception accorded in Qu*é*bec with the sweeping ecclesiastical reforms of Vatican II, which, in terms of elective affinity, helped the Qu*é*b*é*cois to escape from the tutelage of the Church. Throughout this essay it will also become clear that the secularity of contemporary Qu*é*bec was the culmination of a long and fairly intense course of preparation that was conceived well before the 1960s and, more significantly, that it largely proceeded under the auspices of the Catholic Church itself. Yet, despite the fact that these labours were guided by the Church's clergy and peopled with its laity, they had the ironic effect of ushering into Qu*é*bec society the very trends whose results the faithful remnant and their leaders now lament.

Qu*é*bec's Catholicism: A Persistent Tradition

Catholicism in Canada evolved over a period of four hundred years, from the inauguration of the first Catholic colony within Canada in 1608 by Samuel de Champlain to the development of

missions in the seventeenth century to the *aggiornamento* of the Vatican II in the twentieth.[92] During

this extensive period, Canada transformed from what King Louis XIV once described as 'a few acres of

ice and snow,' to a multicultural country with a firmly rooted Catholic Church. Owing to unwavering

evangelization efforts over the centuries, Catholicism currently holds the title as the largest religious

denomination in the country.[93]

Ever since the English conquest of 1760, the Roman Catholic Church of Québec has been the

most important single agency for the defense and perpetuation of French-Canadian heritage in North

America. Perhaps in no region of the world had the Church and its representatives been held in as high

regard among all elements of the population. Over time, Québec Catholicism, in fact, had been so well

adapted to traditional Québec society that when it came to the early twentieth century it was hard for

the Church to situate itself in a context of urbanization, industrialization, and secularization of life. In

the mid-twentieth century, the Church began to face these same problems which confronted European

Catholicism in the nineteenth century. Indeed, Québec was, in a comparative sense, still lagging behind

modernity. While Christian citizens of other Western nations met the challenges of industrialization

and modernization that came with nation-building, French-Canadian nationalists, at the time, embarked

on an aggressive programme of 'Church-building' with the goal of creating an *Église-nation* (nation-

Church) rather than a nation-state.

Duplessis and a Thriving Church

It is usually said, and rightly so, that Québec moved rather late into cultural and political

modernity. Prior to 1960, the provincial government had no ministry of education, no ministry of

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[92] Annette Gagliano, "A Brief History of Evangelization in the Canadian Catholic Church," *Saeculum Undergraduate Academic Journal* Vol. 6, No. 2 (2011).
[93] Allan Smith, "Catholicism," *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, Web, November 1, 2012.

health, and no ministry of social welfare.[94] During his years as premier from 1944 to 1959, Maurice

Duplessis, a conservative-nationalist of the *Union Nationale*, defended this tradition in unbending

fashion, declaring Québec a Catholic province and actively promoted the Church's welfare without any

government interference. The provincial government protected traditional, pre-modern cultural ideas,

restricted religious and political pluralism, and refused to regard the state as responsible for the social

development of the population.[95] As such, in 1958, more than 85 per cent of the population identified

themselves as Catholic and more than 88 per cent of those Catholics attended mass every Sunday.[96] A

virtual army of nuns, priests and brothers, which by 1962 numbered more than 50,000 oversaw the

Church's massive bureaucracy.[97] The Roman Catholic Church of Québec exercised a virtual monopoly

over education (schools, colleges, etc.), health care (i.e. hospitals, health care centres, etc.), and the

social services (social assistance, etc.) offered to French Québecers who formed the majority of the

population. As a result, the Church's organizational presence became ubiquitous. This semi-established

status and public presence was legitimated by the traditional religious nationalism, which united a

conservative, clerical version of Catholicism and French-Canadian ethnic identity.

In this situation, the cultural power of the Church was enormous. It defined Québec's cultural

identity in opposition to the Protestant and secular culture of North America. It demanded unanimity

within its own ranks and supported the government in its opposition to pluralism. The Church was

sustained in its activities by the faith of the vast majority of t people. Their ardent piety produced a

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[94] Gregory Baum, "Catholicism and Secularization in Québec," in *Rethinking Church, State, and Modernity: Canada Between Europe and America*, edited by David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 150.
[95] Ibid., p. 149-50.
[96] Reginald Bibby, *Unknown Gods: The Ongoing Story of Religion in Canada*, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., 1993), p. 6, table 1.1.

[97] Jean Hamelin, "Société en mutation, église en redéfinition, le catholicisme québécois contemporain, de 1940 à nos jours," dans *La crois et le nouveau monde. Histoire religieuse des francophones d'Amérique du nord*, dir. Guy-Marie Oury, 217-36, (Montréal : *É*ditions C.I.D./C.M.D., 1987), p. 224.

culture of solidarity and mutual aid. An intense faith inspired vast members of young people to become priests, sisters, and brothers, dedicated to serve in their own society and the field of overseas missions. This profound loyalty to the Church may seem like an anomaly in the middle of the twentieth century. Yet whenever a people has been conquered by empire and must struggle for its collective survival, the Church easily becomes a symbol of identity and resistance.

There were signs in the 1940s and 1950s that the unanimity in the Catholic Church was seriously being challenged. Joseph Charbonneau, the Archbishop of Montreal, broke ranks with the other bishops in his support of non-confessional institutions and interventions in favour of workers' strikes.[98] The review *Cité libre*, directed by intellectuals relying on liberal Catholic thought coming from France, criticized what it called the clerico-nationalist, corrupt, and undemocratic regime of Duplessis; some even labelled his term in office as the *Grande noirceur*, or Great Darkness.[99] Two priests, Gérard Dion and Louis O'Neil, published a book in 1956 that criticized Duplessis's reactionary policies and advocated democratic and egalitarian ideas.[100] Examining activities and events in these two decades, historians have come to recognize the cultural and social currents that ultimately prepared for the *Révolution tranquille*, or Quiet Revolution. Still, despite these moments of anticipation, when the Liberal government of Jean Lesage was elected on 22 June 1960, a cultural explosion took place that truly deserves the name Quiet Revolution.[101]

The Rallying Cry, the Revolution and Identity

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[98] Jean Hamelin, *Histoire du catholicisme québécoise. Le XXe siècle,* Vol. 2*, De 1940 à nos jours*, ed. Nive Voisine, (Montréal: Boreal Express, 1984), p. 11.

[99] Léon Dion, *Nationalisme et politique au Québec,* (Montréal: Hurtibise HMH, 1975), p. 55-60.

[100] G*érard* Dion and Louis O'Neil, *Les chrétiens et les élections*, (Montréal : *É*ditions de l'Homme, 1956).

[101] Alain-G. *Gagnon* and Michel *Sarra-Bournet*, *Duplessis*: *Entre* la grande *noirceur et la societé libérale*, (Montreal: Éditions Québec-Amérique, 1997).

The *Révolution tranquille* was a period of effervescence. It made Québécois identity political, proud, and fierce, while reducing the Roman Catholic Church of Québéc from a monolith to an anachronism.[102] This 'Quiet Revolution' meant that the state and not the Church was to be "the embodiment of the French nation in Canada."[103] People wanted to catch up with modern society, be open to pluralism, participate in democratic decision-making, express themselves in art and literature free of censorship, and create a modern educational system qualifying students to advance in the fields of science and technology. The agents of this cultural upheaval also wanted to free themselves from the economic domination of the English-Canadian elites and assume full responsibility for their own society.[104] Many, therefore, campaigned under the slogans *Il faut que ça change* ("Things have to change") and *Révolution tranquille, Maintenant ou jamais…Maîtres chez nous* ("Now or never…Masters of our own house").

Charles F. Doran, a leading American observer of Canada, skillfully describes the changes during the second half of the twentieth century:

> Francophone Québecers lifted themselves out of inferior social status, leaving the farm, entering the university, embracing business, celebrating their language and culture. The clergy that had saved Québec from the neglect of Louis XV and his court, and from the hardships of survival in a rough land, now became a burden. A Catholic faith that had provided the social cement for the colony, as well as the solace from fear and from

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[102] Terence Fay, *A History of Canadian Catholics*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 2002), p. 279.

[103] Hubert Guidon, *Québec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood*, ed. Roberta Hamilton and John L. McMullan, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 104.

[104] Gregory Baum, p. 151.

societal and job exclusion for its members, became an embarrassing reminder of a past

that everyone wanted to forget.

…to be modern,…Québecer[s] had to turn against Mother Church, the institution that

had succoured and protected them but that now condemned their materialism. The

Québec Church was the institution that stayed with Québecers when the French elite

abandoned them after the Conquest, that helped defend them against the depredations of

the 1839 Durham Report (that proposed to assimilate them), that cared for the sick and

educated their children, and that provided cultural continuity across three centuries of

difficult survival as a people. Yet under the umbrella of the Quiet Revolution this was

the institution against which they rebelled.[105]

By the 1970s, the Québec state had taken over the Church's work in education, health care, and the

social services. Thus the Church had to react both to its loss of real power and to its loss of control over

the important symbols, stories, and values carried by traditional religious nationalism over the

centuries. By 1980, no nationalist group sought to promote a Catholic culture or to remake Québec's

economy in conformity with the Church's social teaching. No one imagined that Québec was a

Catholic state. Like its control over schools, hospitals, and social services, the Church leadership saw

its control over national movements evaporate in two decades.

Remarkably, the Church reacted to the secularization of Québec society with relative serenity.

Certainly, the bishops and other religious leaders objected to the government's plans for the

secularization of education and the religious communities opposed the reforms which turned their

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[105] Charles F. Doran, *Why Canadian Unity Matters and Why Americas Care: Democratic Pluralism at Risk* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), pp. 78-9.

hospitals into public institutions.[106] Generally, however, Québec society avoided the tragic cultural schism that marked the movement into secular modernity of Catholic countries like France and Italy. In Québec, the Church did not withdraw into a 'Catholic ghetto,' anathematize the new society, and work towards a restoration of the old order.[107] Part of the reason for this was that many of the supporters of the reforms were members of the Church. Part of this also had to do with Vatican II. Both of which I will cover in the following sections.

Vatican II and Religious Modernity

The *Révolution tranquille* coincided with the reforms of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), which radically altered the Church's self-definition, and the emergence of faith and justice movements in the late 1960s and 1970s. Vatican II advocated a new openness to modernity, defended the autonomy of secular institutions, fostered ecumenical relations with Protestants, expressed its respect for religious pluralism, and urged lay people to become responsible actors in their society.[108] Interestingly, it just so happened that just as the Québec state was declaring its autonomy from the Church, the Church was itself affirming the autonomy of political society, the freedom of individual consciences in political matters, and the need for citizens to involve themselves in the important debates and projects of their societies. As a result of this coincidence, Canadian theologian Gregory Baum reasoned that Vatican II helped ease Catholics in Québec into being critical of the old Québec and its religious nationalism, while still helping them to remain good Catholics. Despite misunderstandings, heated disagreements, and personal grievances, the Québec Church and state

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[106] Jean Hamelin et Nicole Gagnon, *Histoire du catholicisme québécoise. Le XXe siècle*. Tome 1 : 1898-1940, (Montréal : Boréal Express, 1984), pp. 245-59.

[107] Gregory Baum, *The Church in Québec*, (Ottawa: Novalis, 1991), pp. 15-47. See also David Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

[108] José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 71-73.

learned to cooperate and compromise in a spirit of pluralism, reform, and tolerance.[109] This is not to

say that Vatican II and the emergence of a faith and justice movement were the direct causes of the

Church's acceptance of the new Québec society and the new nationalism, but these developments had a

sort of elective affinity, that, in one sense, allowed the Church to become more open to compromise

and undermined the position of Catholic conservatives who dreamed of a restoration of the old society.

Catholic Action and the Rise of New Lay Elites

The arrival of the *Révolution tranquille* also heralded the final elevation to power of new elites

that had been forming in Québec for most of the half-century before the provincial election of 1960.

One of the first scholars of Québec to point out this change was the sociologist Jean-Charles Falardeau.

According to Falardeau, these elites composed two broad categories: one, flowing out of the

universities, was poised to enter the expanding state bureaucracy; and another was rising swiftly

through the previously English-speaking ranks of business executives. A salient fact Falardeau alludes

to is that many of those who ascended into the new elites were persons who had gained their formative

organizational experience as leaders of various movements of Catholic Action ("*anciens dirigeants de

l'action catholique*").[110]

The original movements of Catholic Action arose almost one hundred years ago out of the

direction of Catholic energies to the task of "social reconstruction."[111] The call to the service of God on

earth (and thereby the transformation of the world) was not limited to the clergy or religious, the

Catholic Church taught, but was to involve all Catholics, no matter what their status or station. Their

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[109] Gregory Baum, *The Church in Québec*, pp. 38-47.

[110] Jean-Charles Falardeau, "Des élites traditionnelles aux élites nouvelles," *Recherches sociographiques*, Volume 7, numéro 1-2, 1966, p. 139.

[111] Gabriel Clément, *Histoire de l'Action catholique au Canada français*, Rapport de la Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Église, no. 2 (Montréal : Les Éditions Fides, 1972).

work, in turn, was to be pursued through group action that was "specialized" to the social milieu of the believer.

Members of Catholic Action met regularly in intimate settings, in the absence of the clergy, to read Scripture and to divine its meanings for modern times. They thus learned not merely how to organize themselves, but also how to plan in groups; how to reflect, discern, debate, and decide in a manner free and autonomous; and how ultimately to orchestrate outreach activities.[112] Imbued with Catholic Action's decision-making method of "See-Judge-Act," veterans of the movement, including such luminaries as Pierre Juneau, Marc Lalonde, Jean Le Moyne, Gérard Pelletier, Claude Ryan, and Jeanne Sauvé, consequently went on to careers in the media, government, and civil society of Québec.

Pelletier – in his youth an international officer (*sécretaire-général*) of a major organization in Catholic Action (the *Jeunesse étudiante catholique*), and later a Member of Parliament, a federal cabinet minister, and a Canadian ambassador – can be taken as a suitable representative of the post-war Canadian elite in Québec. As an adult, committed simultaneously to religious action in the world, to his profession as a journalist and television broadcaster, and to principled public service, Pelletier saw no conflict between the removal of the Church and its ministers from social institutions and the promotion of an authentic faith. In fact, to him the two processes were complementary. To unbelieving friends, Pelletier was inclined to say, as he confided in 1961, "You are persuaded that the withdrawal of the clergy from temporal responsibilities that are not theirs will lead fatally to the practical undoing of all religious life. We judge, to the contrary, that the Church in Québec needs to abandon a role that is not

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[112] Robert Choquette, *Canada's Religions : An Historical Introduction*, Religions and Beliefs Series, no. 12 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2004), pp. 345-50.

its own in order to rediscover its true direction and that it will emerge greater from this

transformation."[113]

As Catholic Action reached its historical zenith in Canada, however, the seeds were sown for a

very different type of society in francophone Qu*é*bec, one that would be revealed more fully by the

1960s, at the first opportunity for liberalization of political leadership, of basic schooling and of the

values of the workplace. Religious men and women, many with advanced training, were streaming

from the monasteries and convents of Qu*é*bec and moving unimpeded into positions within the

mushrooming public bureaucracies of education and social service, as well as into increasingly broad-

based private corporations. They joined there laypersons whose own fidelity to Catholicism

encouraged a devotion to constructing the Kingdom of God in the world of mundane affairs. With the

onset of the *Révolution tranquille*, then, the social doctrine of the Church henceforth not only admitted

the necessity of an expanded intervention by the State, it even went so far as to encourage lay people to

work fervently for it. And so that the laity could make of the State a genuine setting for the

embodiment and blossoming of spiritual values, the Church gave up its drive to influence temporal

structures directly.

The sociological irony of Qu*é*bec's secularization thus came to a proper fruition: it was not at

the hands of modern doubters and scoffers at religion that the core of Qu*é*bec society was evacuated of

the Catholic Church's once-dominant presence, but rather through the faith-filled intentions of

religious-motivated and socially-committed Catholic laypersons and of onetime professional operatives

of the Church itself. The knowledge of coordination; the facility with organizational personnel,

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[113] "Vous êtes persuadés que le repli du clergé hors des responsabilités temporelles qui ne sont pas les siennes entrainera fatalement l'annulation pratique de toute vie religieuse. Nous estimons au contraire que *É*glise québécoise a besoin d'abandonner un rôle qui n'est pas le sien pour retrouver son vrai sens et qu'elle sortira plus grande de cette transformation." Quoted in Meunier and Warren, Sortir de la "Grande noirceur," p. 158.

funding, and communications; and the skill at administration that time spent in Catholic associations (and, to a different degree, in Catholic communities of men and women) had bestowed on the faithful were all transferable assets. They constituted a kind of human capital that, when eventually cashed, dislodged the Catholic Church from its paramount position in Québec society.

Many social institutions experienced transformation due the *Révolution*. No longer, then, was the power to define and to alter Québec's culture lodged exclusively in the Catholic Church. In the eyes of countless observers and commentators, the power to interpret Québec's provincial patrimony and to address its national destiny belonged to the new experts of a government and a private sector that spread in tandem throughout the middle part of the twentieth century. "The great majority of the architects and implementers of Québec's entrance into the modern world and prosperity…are also the principal people responsible for the considerable weakening of the very institution that put them into the world," namely the Roman Catholic Church.[114]

Evidence of a Declining Faith with Hallowed Residue

On the surface, the Catholic Church in Québec felt the effects of an astonishing pattern of 'secularization' after the 1960s. The internal records of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops show that, between 1966 and 1988, the number of diocesan priests in Québec decreased by more than one quarter, from approximately 8,800 to 6,400.[115] By 2005, they numbered 2,700. The same trend has occurred among the religious orders for both men and women. Ordinations, which hit their high point

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[114] Alain Chanlat and Renée Bédard, "Managing in the Québec Style: Originality and Vulnerability," *International Studies of Management and Organization* 21 (September 1991), p. 29.

[115] Jacques Legare, "Les religieuses du Canada : Leur évolution numérique entre 1965 et 1980," *Recherches sociographiques* 10 (janvier-avril 1969), pp. 7-21.

in 1963, when 127 priests were consecrated for Québec, dwindled to the degree that in 1988, merely seventeen men received holy orders.[116]

Moreover, in the last fifty years, rates of participation in religious services have declined everywhere in Canada. A Gallup Poll conducted in 1946 found that two-thirds (67 per cent) of Canadian adults attended religious worship in a typical week, but a similar survey in 1996 showed that this proportion had dropped to 20 per cent.[117] Over the decade separating 1988 and 1998, those who attended church at least once per month fell from 41 to 34 per cent of the Canadian adult population.[118] This dissipation of devotion was especially acute in Québec, where monthly attendance plummeted from 48 per cent in 1986 to 29 per cent by 1998.[119]

With respect to attendance at Mass, which for many believers is the hallmark of Catholic identity, the data from Québec is unremittingly negative. The earliest Canadian survey on record that invited self-reports of church attendance, a Gallup Poll from 1945, suggests that at the end of the Second World War, nearly nine out of ten Catholics in Québec went to Mass on a weekly basis.[120] This impressively high rate of Mass attendance held fairly steady through the next two decades: in 1957 it stood at 88 per cent and in 1965 at 85 per cent. But by 1970, the percentage of Québecers attending weekly had decreased sharply to 65.

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[116] Gary Caldwell and Madeleine Gauthier, "Religious Institutions," in Langlois et al., *Recent Social Trends in Québec*, pp. 317-18 and pp. 322-23.

[117] "Canadian Social Trends Backgrounder: 'No Religion' Continues to Grow," *Canadian Social Trends* (Autumn 1998), p. 6.

[118] Warren Clark, "Patterns of Religious Attendance," *Canadian Social Trends* (Winter 2000), p. 23.

[119] Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, *Religious Groups in Canada*, Profile Series, (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2001), p. 5.

[120] Reginald Bibby, *Restless Gods: The Renaissance of Religion in Canada*, Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 2002), p. 11 and pp. 15-20.

It is important to note, however, despite all of the declension between the role of the Church

and State in Qu*é*bec, it did not markedly change the almost unanimous rates at which Qu*é*bec

Catholics, then and now, profess to believe in the existence of God and the divinity of Jesus Christ, and

without overwhelming majorities who confess a personal habit of at least occasional prayer.[121] Indeed,

Qu*é*bec is not as secular as the contemporary media makes it out to be. The French-Canadian nation is

still, in fact, a land of Catholicism. According to a 2008 Léger Marketing poll, the proportion of

Qu*é*bec's nearly six million Catholics who attend mass weekly now stands at 6 per cent, the lowest of

any Western society.[122] But therein lies a paradox. That more than 80 per cent of Qu*é*becers still

declare themselves Catholics, according to the 2001 census, suggests an attachment to the faith. If not a

spiritual one, at least a cultural one.[123]

Qu*é*bec and *Laïcité* Today

The flurry of frenetic activity over the course of Québec's history has left a permanent mark, so

that in our day the *Révolution tranquille* primarily signifies not the growth of the Qu*é*bec state or the

rationalization of its services – although these did occur – but the veritable coming-of-age of a people

in its belated encounter with modernity.[124]

To assume, however, that religion is Qu*é*bec's greatest foe – and that forbidding public servants

to wear religious symbols (as is the case today) is somehow a victory for provincial identity – is an

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[121] Reginald Bibby, "*La Religion* à *la carte* au Québec: Un problème d'offre, de demande, ou des deux?" in *Globe*, edited by Robert Mager and Martin Meunier, Volume 10/2, 2007-2008, pp. 137-38.

[122] Konrad Yakabuski, "Neither practicing or believing, but Catholic even so," *The Globe and Mail*, August 2009, Web, November 20, 2013.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Réjean Pelletier, "La Révolution tranquille," in *Le Québec en jeu : Comprendre les grands défis,* eds. Gérard Daigle and Guy Rocher, (Montréal : Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992), pp. 609-24.

unfortunate misreading of history. The *Révolution tranquille* put thousands of clerics out of jobs and hundreds of churches onto the real estate market, but it did not necessarily eliminate religion in the province. Instead, it gave people the freedom to practice informally, experimentally, and on their own terms. It was a victory for religious freedom over institutional control – which is why current Premier Pauline Marois's *Charte des valeurs québécoises* is so profoundly misguided.

Indeed, although the *Révolution* was inspired by and promoted some complaints against religion, even anticlericalism, there was no massive rejection of religion on behalf of early modernizers. Even today, while only 29 per cent of Catholics attend mass on Sunday, most have retained their Catholic identity and insist on Catholic religious education for their children.[125] Other remnants of the Catholicism persist. Municipalities, for example, are still widely referred to as *paroisses* (parishes). Every saint, no matter how obscure, has a village or street named for him or her, from Cléophas to Tharcisius. The national holiday is officially known as *la Fête nationale*, but only bureaucrats, TV announcers and politicians call it that. To everyone else, it is still *la Saint-Jean Baptiste*. If a person takes a walk around Québec's legislature, they will find plenty of Roman Catholic symbols too: the white cross on the Québec flag, the statues of missionaries – there is even a chapel a stone's throw away from the Premier's office, in a government building. Mass for civil servants is held there twice a week. Even inside the legislature itself, a crucifix hangs in the Blue Room, right above the Speaker's Chair. It dates back to 1936, when Premier Duplessis decided to symbolically seal the bond between the government and the Catholic Church.

The aftermath of *Révolution*'s transition is highly visible in the reduced position of the Roman Catholic Church in contemporary Québec. Over time, the Church and its ubiquitous functionaries had

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[125] Micheline Milot, "Le catholicisme au creuset de la culture," *Studies in Religion*, 20, no. 1, (1991) : pp. 51-64.

consumed so much of the active space in the civil realm that for them, under pressure from an elite laity who had succeeded in mastering much of the same secular expertise, no measured withdrawal from power was possible. Instead, the retreat, while orderly, verged on the total, and a virtually complete cave-in of traditional structures ensued, leading to the dismal fate of institutional religion in the province today. Interestingly, Québec's historical struggle with the Church is akin to many other Western societies of lapsed Catholics, which still show somewhat of an attachment to religious traditions without necessarily embracing the doctrine itself. As Charles Taylor writes in *A Stillborn God*, the most secular societies in the West also "retain the vestigial public reference to God in public space." Québec is no less an exception.

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Balance of Power Theory and a Unipolar International System
Meicen Sun

"Balance of power theory grew out of many centuries of multipolarity and a few decades of bipolarity. Today the world is characterized by unprecedented unipolarity. Balance of power theory, therefore, cannot provide guidance for the world we are in."

In responding to this statement I will first discuss the logical fallacy inherent in its argument: Though the balance of power theory (BOP, below[126]) emerged concurrent to certain types of power configuration in world politics – multipolarity and bipolarity in this case, it does not follow that it was these types of configuration *per se* that gave rise to the theory itself. Multipolarity and bipolarity can, and should be considered themselves as manifestations of the underlying logic of the international system which the BOP theory also embodies. This logic of relative positionality of states in an anarchic system, as I will argue, has not fundamentally changed since the emergence of BOP theory. This leads to the second, empirical problem with the statement. On the one hand, a *de facto* unipolarity characterized by American hegemony has been around for much longer than since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the current economic and political status of China places it in a pseudo-superpower position vis-à-vis the United States. Both of these mean that the degree of unipolarity we observe today relative to the bipolarity of the Cold War is, if any, weak. Therefore, much of BOP's relevance in the bipolar world will continue to be in today's international system.

The BOP theory: Core assumptions and the (ir)relevance of polarity

We should first understand the logic that gave rise to the BOP theory. Two assumptions are of central relevance. First, the international system is considered to be anarchic, with no system-wide authority being formally enforced on its agents (Waltz 1979, 88). Because of this "self-help" nature of

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[126] I will use the acronym "BOP" to refer to the theory of balance of power, and "balance of power" to refer to the actual phenomenon of balance of power.

52

the system, states do not have a world government to resort to in a situation of danger, but they can only try to increase their capabilities relative to one another through either internal efforts of self-strengthening, or external efforts of alignment and realignment with other states (Waltz 1979, 118). Second, states are the principle actors in the international system, as they "set the terms of the intercourse" (Waltz 1979, 96), monopolize the "legitimate use of force" (Waltz 1979, 104) within their territories and generally conduct foreign policy in a "single voice" (Waltz 1959, 178-179). Hence states are also considered to be unitary actors in the international system. This latter assumption is important because if non-state or transnational actors are powerful enough to challenge state actors, power configuration in the world may no longer be considered in terms of polarity but in terms of the number of layers of policy "networks"[127] instead. I base my argument on these two core assumptions about the international system also because they have been widely accepted not only in realism and neorealism, but in neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984, etc.) and to some degree in constructivism (Wendt 1999, etc.) as well. They are thus not derivative from exclusively realist or neorealist beliefs, such as relative power maximization.

    With this, I now discuss why polarity is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain the balance of power. The question of sufficiency can be answered with respect to why balance of power does not always occur even in a multipolar or bipolar world, and that of necessity with respect to why balance of power can still occur even with unipolarity. According to Waltz, balance of power occurs when, given "two coalitions" formed in the international system, secondary states, if free to choose, will side with the weaker, so as to avoid being threatened by the stronger side (Waltz 1979, 127). This condition has led some to question the validity of BOP in a unipolar world, since two or more states need to coexist

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[127] This term is directly borrowed from the title of *Networked Politics* by Miles Kahler, but numerous works have alluded to the same concept, such as those by Kathryn Sikkink, Martha Finnemore and Anne-Marie Slaughter, to name a few.

in the system in order for the theory to hold (Waltz 1979, 118). However, as I have said, once we accept the two core assumptions (that of anarchy and that of states being principle actors) this condition is not necessary for BOP to be relevant. The balance of power, as Waltz suggests, is a "result" – an outcome variable that reflects the causal effect of the explanatory variables which are, in his theory, anarchy and distribution of power in the international system. This tension within Waltz's own argument has indeed invited criticism that his version of the BOP theory is essentially attempting to explain one dependent variable (the occurrence of balance of power) with another (polarity) (Lebow, 27). To sidestep this potential loophole, therefore, we need to assess the relevance of BOP by examining whether the same structural constraints that engender balancing in the multipolar or bipolar systems are also present in a unipolar world.

If the balance of power could not be directly deduced from system polarity, what then would predict its occurrence? To answer this question is to go back to the two core assumptions and see what explanatory variables can be derived from these assumptions that will have some observable implications with regard to balancing. The likelihood of balance of power is therefore a function of these variables which, as I will show, boil down to 1) *intention* – notably the intention or the perceived intention of the major powers in the system, 2) *preference* of the states, particularly that between absolute and relative gains, and 3) *contingency*, often related to the availability of new information in a given situation, which may exogenously change the first two variables. Most importantly, none of the three is conditional on a certain type of polarity to be effectual.

Three explanatory variables for predicting balancing: intention, preference, contingency

The intention, or the perceived intention of a major power determines whether balancing will be preferred by secondary states over other options such as bandwagoning. We can think of this in terms both of why smaller states sometimes succumb to the sphere of the strongest power in the system, and

of why they sometimes stay away from it, or challenge it by joining the second biggest power if there were one. In his analysis of the conditions for cooperation under the security dilemma, Robert Jervis shows that when there are pervasive offensive advantage and indistinguishability between offense and defense (the "worst case" scenario), security dilemma between states can be so acute as to virtually squeeze out the "fluidity" necessary for any balance of power to occur (Jervis 1978, 186-189). By incurring incorrect "inferences", offensive advantage and offense-defense indistinguishability ultimately serve to alter the perceived intention of the adversary as being aggressive or non-aggressive (Jervis 1978, 201). This will then dictate the smaller states' decision to or not to balance. If, however, the major power is perceived to have not only a non-aggressive intention, but also a benign intention of providing certain public goods, smaller states may choose to free-ride on these benefits while submitting to the major power's sphere of influence in return. An outcome of so-called "hegemonic stability" may then ensue (Keohane 1984, 12). Thus along the dimension of perceived intention, balance of power occurs when states have reservations about the major power or the hegemon's intention but not to the extent that a precipitation to war is so imminent as to render balancing infeasible.

Second, balance of power is closely related to the states' preference for relative versus absolute gains. From an offensive realist point of view, John Mearsheimer contends that states concerned with balance of power must think in terms of relative rather than absolute gain – that is, their military advantage over others regardless of how much capability they each have. The underlying logic here is at once intuitive – given a self-help system and self-interested states, "the greater military advantage one state has…the more secure it is" (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 11-12), and problematic – since the auxiliary assumption that every state would then always prefer to have maximum military power in the system (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 12) is practically meaningless. Similarly, Joseph Grieco points out that

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with the ever present possibility of war in an anarchic system, states may not cooperate even with their allies because survival is guaranteed only with a "proportionate advantage" (Grieco in Baldwin ed., 127-130). The concern for relative gain predicts that states will prefer balance of power over collective security because the latter requires that states trust one another enough to completely forgo relative gain through unilateral disarmament, which is inherently at odds with the idea of having a positional advantage for self-defense (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 36). Meanwhile, the neoliberal institutionalist cooperation theory essentially presumes the pursuit of absolute gain over relative gain for states to achieve cooperation (Keohane 1984, 68). On a broader scale, therefore, the pursuit of relative gain would undercut international cooperation in general, in both high and low politics. It is safe to say that in practice, states are concerned with *both* relative *and* absolute gains to different degrees under different circumstances. Scholars like Duncan Snidal and Robert Axelrod have rigorously demonstrated the complexity of situations in which these two competing interests dynamically interact and change over time (see for example Snidal in Baldwin ed. and Axelrod 1984, Chapter 2). In general, though, a prevalent preference for relative gains and more specifically, military positionality among states increases the likelihood of balancing relative to collective security. If states tend to favor absolute gains instead, we are more likely to see phenomena such as deep international institutions and pluralist security communities.

But even if there existed a malign hegemon that other states wanted to balance against, and the states all pursued relative gains, balance of power would still be conditional. That is, even with the aforementioned systemic constraints, balance of power is not a given without knowing the specific contingency factors unique to each situation. One additional implication of an anarchic system is pervasive uncertainty resulting from the scarcity of information, since all states have an incentive to misrepresent in order to further their positionality in event of war (Fearon 1998, 274). This explains

why, perhaps in a paradoxical way, historically even in periods of multipolarity and bipolarity characterized by intense suspicion and tension, balancing did not happen as often as BOP would predict. The crux is the unexpected availability of new information which leads to a change in the course of action by altering preexisting beliefs and preferences. The European states' collective decision to buttress the rising challenger Prussia in the 1800s despite the latter's clear expansionist tendency shows that neither intention nor preference can be taken as a given, but both are subject to circumstantial construction (Goddard, 119). In times of crisis, this constructing effect may be especially strong. Such characterized the interwar period, and resulted in a significant lag in the European states' learning which may have otherwise incurred greater balance against the revisionist Germany (Jervis 1978, 184). Still caught up in a spirit of collective security from the first war, these states were too "hot-headed" to switch to the phlegmatic behavior of balancing (Weisiger, lecture). This, however, had less to do with their perception of Germany or their pursuit of relative/absolute gains than with the transformational effect of the trauma of World War I. In short, the more rapid and unpredictable is the flux of information in a given situation, the less likely that the balance of power contingent on existing beliefs and preferences will occur as predicted.

The fall of USSR, the rise of China and empirical implications for the BOP theory

Having shown that BOP has less to do with polarity than with intention of aggression, preference for relative gains, and circumstantial factors in an anarchic world, I will now show why our current system characterized by American hegemony is not so much different from the preceding ones. Doing so will not only address the necessity question mentioned earlier, but also show that even if we accept the premise that BOP is less applicable to unipolarity than to multipolarity and bipolarity, this hardly affects BOP's relevance to today's world. Though BOP gained much leverage during the Cold War which is considered a textbook case of bipolarity, a closer look at Waltz's discussion of American

dominance at the time reveals what really resembles a picture of American hegemony rather than bipolarity (Waltz 1979, 146-160). Most important, however, is the fact that concurrent to this widening gap between the U.S. and the USSR, a corresponding increase in the balance of power against the U.S. did not occur. Rather, we saw the opposite happen where Soviet satellite states started drifting away one after another. This greatly undermines BOP's explanatory power even for bipolarity. Richard Lebow's succinct summary of the years leading to the Soviet collapse illustrates that not only did the USSR productivity remain vastly inferior to that of the U.S., but also that its military (nuclear) capabilities never reached the level as to be a real challenger to the U.S. Hence, the actual period of strict bipolarity during the Cold War is much shorter than is conventionally believed (Lebow, 28-31). It is debatable as to what extent the Soviet "anomaly" was primarily the result of perception, preference or contingency (such as that discussed in Risse, 26), but major discordances between the balance of power and polarity lend further support to my argument that BOP is not determined by polarity itself, but by variables inherent in the international system, which may or may not lead to a concurrence of balance of power and certain types of polarity.

The demarcation between the bipolar Cold War system and the unipolar post-Cold War system is therefore fuzzy at best. This has been further complicated by China's rise in the most recent decades. To put things in perspective: At the peak of the Cold War, the U.S. enjoyed a GDP of US$5,200 billion – about twice of that of the USSR ($2,700 billion). As of last year, it was $16,000 – also about twice of that of China's ($8,200 billion).[128] If we were to measure superpower status by nuclear capability (which many scholars use to pinpoint the start of Cold War), the picture is even more ambiguous, with

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[128] *The World Factbook*, Central Intelligence Agency.

as many as nine states currently having nuclear weapons, including North Korea.[129] Rather than

questioning American hegemony today – which this paper does not intend to do, these facts simply

serve to remind us of the continuity rather than discreteness of the recent stages of polarity. Because of

this, the supposed unipolarity as of present has little bearing on the validity of the BOP theory in

explaining state behavior. Hans Morgenthau reaffirms the balance of power as a "perennial element" in

human history, regardless of the "contemporary conditions" that the international system operates

under (Morgenthau, 9-10). The essence of the BOP theory cannot be reduced to the occurrence of

balance of power. With the logic of anarchy and principality of state actors largely unchanged, we can

therefore imagine a situation of balancing against the U.S. even in a unipolar system if the U.S. is no

longer perceived as a benign hegemon and if states are more concerned with their military disadvantage

as a result, especially when a combination of situational factors and diplomatic efforts further facilitates

such a change in perception and preference.

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129 *Ibid.*

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